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BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW PROFESSORS IN SUPPORT OF
FEDERAL RESPONDENTS AND
INTERVENOR-RESPONDENTS
The undersigned environmental law professors
respectfully submit this brief as amici curiae in
support of Federal Respondents and IntervenorRespondents.1
INTERESTS OF THE AMICI CURIAE
Amici curiae are twenty-six professors of law
who research, teach, and write about environmental
law, natural resources law, property law, and
administrative law. Amici have particular expertise
regarding the history, purpose, procedures, and
application of the substantive standards of the
Endangered Species Act (ESA), the nation’s premier
wildlife conservation law. This case concerns a
question of first impression that goes to the heart of
the conservation provisions of the ESA, namely
whether the law protects the historic but currently
unoccupied habitat of an endangered species (the
dusky gopher frog) that has been determined by the
Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, amici curiae state that
no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and
no person or entity other than amici curiae or their counsel made
a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this
brief. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.3, all appropriate
parties have filed letters granting blanket consent to the filing
of amici curiae briefs.
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Secretary of the Interior, based on the best scientific
data available, to be “essential for the conservation”
of the species. The answer to this question could have
profound consequences for a growing list of imperiled
species whose historic habitat has been greatly
reduced and degraded by the appropriation of land
and natural resources to serve human needs.
Amici wish to provide the Court with their
independent views on how this important provision of
the ESA should be interpreted and what role the
courts should play in reviewing the exercise of the
discretionary authority that Congress granted to the
Secretary. A list of the amici and their school
affiliations is provided in the Appendix.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The International Union for the Conservation
of Nature ranks the dusky gopher frog (Rana sevosa)
among the top 100 most threatened species in the
world. Live Science Staff, 100 Most Threatened
Species, Live Science (Sept. 11, 2012, 9:56 AM),
https://www.livescience.com/31743-100-mostthreatened-species.html. This critically endangered
amphibian was found historically across parts of
southwest Alabama, southern Mississippi, and
southeast Louisiana.
Final Rule To List the
Mississippi Gopher Frog Distinct Population Segment
of Dusky Gopher Frog as Endangered, 66 Fed. Reg.
62,993, 62,994 (Dec. 4, 2001) (to be codified at 50
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C.F.R. pt. 17).2 But the current total population of
dusky gopher frogs in the wild is less than 100
individuals living in three fragmented locations in
Mississippi. Pet. App. 108a n.28; Dusky Gopher Frog
Recovery Team & Mississippi Field Office U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Service, Dusky Gopher Frog (Rana sevosa)
Recovery Plan (July 23, 2015), at iv [hereinafter
“Recovery Plan”]. Habitat loss and degradation
threaten the survival and recovery of the dusky
gopher frog. Recovery Plan, supra, at iv. Less than
three percent of the old-growth longleaf pine-savanna
upon which the dusky gopher frog and other endemic
species depend remains. Lewis Thomas, Restoring a
Disappearing Ecosystem: the Longleaf Pine Savanna,
U.S. Dep’t of Agric. Forest Serv. (2013). Thus, as the
record demonstrates, recovery of the dusky gopher
frog will not be possible “without the establishment of
additional breeding populations.” Final Designation
of Critical Habitat for Dusky Gopher Frog (Previously
Mississippi Gopher Frog), 77 Fed. Reg. 35,117, 35,124
(June 12, 2012) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17)
[hereinafter “Final Designation”].

At the time of listing, the species was known as the Mississippi
gopher frog (Rana capito sevosa), a distinct population segment
of the dusky gopher frog (Rana capito). Final Designation of
Critical Habitat for Dusky Gopher Frog (Previously Mississippi
Gopher Frog), 77 Fed. Reg. 35,117, 35,118 (June 12, 2012) (to be
codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). The species has since been
recognized as its own species by the herpetological scientific
community, and its scientific name has been changed to Rana
sevosa. Id.
2
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To comply with its obligations under the ESA
to promote the recovery of dusky gopher frogs, the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) initially
proposed designating eleven units of critical habitat
for the species in Mississippi. Proposed Designation
of Critical Habitat for Mississippi Gopher Frog, 75
Fed. Reg. 31,387 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 50
C.F.R. pt. 17). Pursuant to its statutory duty to use
the “best scientific data available,” 16 U.S.C.
§ 1533(b)(2), and as required by its peer review policy,
FWS submitted the proposed critical habitat
designation to relevant outside scientific experts for
their evaluation. Notice of Interagency Cooperative
Policy for Peer Review in Endangered Species Act
Activities, 59 Fed. Reg. 34,270 (July 1, 1994); Final
Designation, 77 Fed. Reg. at 35,119.
These
independent
experts
deemed
the
proposed
designation insufficient for the conservation of the
dusky gopher frog, stating that “additional habitat
should be considered throughout the historic range of
the species.” Final Designation, 77 Fed. Reg. at
35,119. Specifically, they recommended including
habitat in Louisiana to support the continued
existence and recovery of the frog. Id. Consistent
with the best scientific data available, FWS expanded
its critical habitat designation to include historic, but
currently unoccupied habitat outside of Mississippi in
St. Tammany Parish, Louisiana. Id. at 35,124.
FWS determined that the five ephemeral ponds
located on the St. Tammany Parish tract (Unit 1)
provide “breeding habitat that in its totality is not

5
known to be present elsewhere within the historic
range of the dusky gopher frog.” Id. According to
scientific experts, Unit 1’s landscape structure of
multiple breeding ponds interconnected by forested
upland habitat mimics the natural, historic landscape
of dusky gopher frogs that is capable of supporting a
viable population. See Recovery Plan, supra, at 13.
The Secretary further determined that maintaining
the five seasonally flooded ponds within this area as
suitable habitat into which dusky gopher frogs could
be translocated is “essential to decrease the risk of
extinction of the species resulting from [wildfire,
disease, and other] stochastic events and provide for
the species’ eventual recovery.” Final Designation, 77
Fed. Reg. at 35,133. Unit 1 also serves as a refuge for
the frog from “environmental threats or catastrophic
events,” including climate change, which will
“undoubtedly affect [frogs] in the coming decades.” 3
Id. at 35,124.
Unit 1 consists of a complex of five ephemeral
ponds and their associated uplands, which as late as
1965 hosted at least two breeding sites for the last
known population of the dusky gopher frog outside
Amphibians are among the species most at risk from climate
change because they are susceptible to desiccation, or drying out.
Final Designation, 77 Fed. Reg. at 35,124. Climate change may
impact the amount or frequency of precipitation, causing
irregular and drier conditions. Id.
This is particularly
significant for the dusky gopher frog, which relies on seasonally
flooded ponds sourced by heavy winter rain events for breeding.
Id. at 35,131.
3
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Mississippi. Id. at 35,315. Ephemeral ponds suitable
for dusky gopher frog breeding cannot be replicated.
Id. at 35,123. Although artificial, man-made ponds
have been successfully used for breeding other gopher
frog species, dusky gopher frogs require ponds with
more specific features for breeding, namely “grassy,
acidic, isolated, ephemeral, depressional wetlands”
(or seasonal ponds) lacking predaceous fish. Id. at
35,123; Recovery Plan, supra, at iv. Ponds must “hold
water long enough to allow for tadpole development
and metamorphosis, but if they hold water too long
they become permanent ponds and no longer have
value for [dusky gopher frogs].” Final Designation, 77
Fed. Reg. at 35,123. Despite FWS’s ongoing efforts for
over a decade at the DeSoto National Forest, it has
not established a successful breeding site due to the
challenges of creating a functional ephemeral wetland
(or seasonal pond) in the landscape. Id. Re-creating
elsewhere a site similar to Unit 1 that contains not
one, but five functional, suitable (and rare) ephemeral
breeding ponds in a natural landscape within a
timeframe
that
would
“provide
near-term
conservation benefits to the dusky gopher frog” is
extremely unlikely, if not impossible. Id.
In addition, the surrounding marginally
suitable upland habitat of Unit 1 can be successfully
restored “with reasonable effort” to provide
nonbreeding habitat for dusky gopher frogs. Id. at
35,135. FWS has identified a number of voluntary
conservation incentives for private landowners to
achieve habitat restoration in Unit 1, such as habitat

7
conservation plans that incorporate the landowners’
timber management goals and private landowner
funding for habitat management through the U.S.
Department of Agriculture’s Healthy Forests
Initiative. Id.
Based on the best scientific data available, the
Secretary determined that the presence of ephemeral
ponds is essential to the recovery of the species
because of “the low number of remaining populations
and severely restricted range of the [frogs]” and the
restorable nature of the nonbreeding habitat. Id. at
35,133. By providing breeding habitat capable of
supporting multiple local populations of the frog at a
geographically
distant
location
from
living
populations, Unit 1 increases the frog’s resiliency to
extinction and its ability to recover, which the
Secretary has determined is “essential for the
conservation of the [species].” Id. at 35,130.
As the Secretary recognized, designation of
unoccupied habitat, even though it may not be
currently suitable, will become increasingly
important to the survival of the growing list of species
vulnerable to climate change. Id. at 35,124.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Fifth Circuit correctly upheld the
Secretary’s designation of the St. Tammany Parish
tract (Unit 1) as critical habitat for the dusky gopher
frog. To advance the ESA’s goals of species survival

8
and recovery, Congress explicitly gave the Secretary
broad discretion to designate as critical habitat areas
that are unoccupied where the Secretary determines
“that such areas are essential for the conservation” of
the species. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(ii). The question
whether designation of such habitat has the
potential to serve the recovery goals for a particular
species is a matter within the sound expertise of the
Secretary.
Here, the Secretary reasonably interpreted the
ESA when he found that Unit 1—an area that the frog
previously occupied and that continues to contain
rare ephemeral ponds suitable for the frog’s breeding
habitat—is “essential for the conservation” of the
species. Accordingly, and based on the unanimous
recommendation of the scientific peer review panel,
the Secretary properly designated the area as critical
habitat. The text, structure, purpose, and legislative
history of the ESA support the Secretary’s
interpretation and critical habitat designation.
Contrary to Petitioner’s argument and the
views of the dissent below, the plain text of the ESA
does not include a “habitability” requirement.
Rather, Congress made a conscious decision to
differentiate between occupied and unoccupied
habitat, making it clear that unoccupied habitat need
not contain all of the “physical or biological features”
required for immediate occupancy.
See id.
§ 1532(5)(A)(i), (ii).

9
The structure of the Act, along with its broad
remedial purpose of species recovery, supports the
Secretary’s interpretation of “essential for the
conservation” of the species.
The ESA defines
“conservation” as “the use of all methods and
procedures which are necessary to bring any
endangered species . . . to the point at which the
measures provided pursuant to [the Act] are no longer
necessary.” Id. § 1532(3). Another provision requires
the Secretary to develop and implement recovery
plans “for the conservation and survival of
endangered species.”
Id. § 1533(f)(1).
These
provisions—read together against the backdrop of a
statutory scheme aimed at species recovery—support
the interpretation that the Secretary may designate
unoccupied habitat as critical habitat even if, as here,
it has been altered by human activities and requires
substantial restoration in order to fully meet the
physical and biological needs of the species. Because
the land at issue in this case offers the only viable
option for species recovery, prohibiting the Secretary
from designating that land would be contrary to the
Act’s structure and purpose.
The
legislative
history
confirms
the
reasonableness of the Secretary’s interpretation and
contradicts Petitioner’s reading.
In the 1978
amendments to the Act, Congress explicitly rejected
language that would have imposed temporal and
habitability requirements on the designation of
unoccupied habitat. This history further confirms
that Congress intended to give the Secretary broad
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authority to designate unoccupied critical habitat
that might require the reintroduction of species
unable to reach it on their own.
Contrary to Petitioner’s suggestion, the
interpretation of the ESA that amici support would
not grant carte blanche authority to the Secretary to
designate anything and everything as critical habitat.
The presence of a rare, virtually impossible to
reproduce complex of breeding ponds—the last
remaining within the historic range of the frog outside
of Mississippi—is what renders the protection of Unit
1 “essential for the conservation” of the frog and
justifies the Secretary’s critical habitat designation.
The Fifth Circuit also correctly declined to
review the Secretary’s decision not to exercise his
discretion to exclude an area from critical habitat
designation. The text of section 4(b)(2) limits the
Secretary’s discretion to exclude an area from
designation in certain circumstances (i.e. where the
benefits of exclusion do not outweigh the benefits of
inclusion or where extinction would result from
exclusion). A decision to exclude—which is equivalent
to a decision not to designate critical habitat—is,
therefore, properly reviewable.
However, the statute is silent with respect to
decisions not to exclude. Section 4(b)(2) contains no
“judicially manageable standards” limiting the
Secretary’s exercise of discretionary authority not to
exclude. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985).
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Thus, a decision by the Secretary not to exclude an
area from designation is unreviewable because it is
“committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C.
§ 701(a)(2).
ARGUMENT
I.

The Secretary’s Determination That
Protection of Unit 1 Is “Essential for
the Conservation” of the Dusky
Gopher Frog Is Entitled to Deference
Because It Is Supported by the Best
Scientific Data Available as well as
the Text, Structure, Purpose, and
Legislative History of the Endangered
Species Act.

The question presented is whether the
Secretary exceeded the scope of his statutory
authority in designating Unit 1 as critical habitat
even though it currently lacks some of the physical
and biological features required to fully support the
gopher frog. The question ultimately turns on the
meaning of the phrase “essential for the conservation
of the species.” Congress has not spoken directly to
the precise question at issue, namely whether
unoccupied habitat must be immediately “habitable”
in order to be declared “essential for the conservation”
of the dusky gopher frog. Nevertheless, it is clear
from the text, structure, purpose, and history of the
ESA, as well as the comprehensive administrative
record developed in this case, that the Secretary
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properly exercised the broad discretion Congress gave
him to use “all methods and procedures which are
necessary to bring any endangered species or
threatened species to the point at which the measures
provided pursuant to this chapter are no longer
necessary.” 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3).
Where a statute “is silent or ambiguous” with
respect to a specific term, an agency’s reasonable
interpretation of that term is entitled to substantial
deference. Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984) (observing that Court has
“long recognized that considerable weight should be
accorded to an executive department’s construction of
a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer”).
When Congress enacted the ESA, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–
44, it “delegated broad administrative and
interpretive power to the Secretary,” as necessary to
execute the complex policy decisions required under
the Act. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for
a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 708 (1995) (noting that
Congress gave Secretary “latitude . . . in enforcing the
statute”).
Where Congress has “entrusted the
Secretary with broad discretion,” the Court is
“especially reluctant to substitute [its] views” for
those of the Secretary. Id. Importantly, the ESA need
not “compel[] the Secretary’s interpretation”; it is
sufficient that the interpretation is reasonable and
that “Congress did not unambiguously manifest its
intent to adopt” an opposing view. Id. at 703.

13
In section 4 of the ESA, Congress directed the
Secretary, “to the maximum extent prudent and
determinable,” to designate critical habitat to protect
and recover imperiled species.
16 U.S.C.
§ 1533(a)(3)(A). Habitat loss and degradation are the
leading causes of species endangerment in North
America, and threats to habitat affect more than 85%
of listed species under the ESA. Amy N. Hagen &
Karen E. Hodges, Resolving Critical Habitat
Designation Failures: Reconciling Law, Policy, and
Biology, 20 Conservation Biology 399, 400 (2006).
Congress highlighted the importance of habitat
conservation in the ESA’s stated purpose: “to provide
a means whereby the ecosystems upon which
endangered species and threatened species depend
may be conserved [and] to provide a program for the
conservation of such [species].” 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b).
Congress further defined “conservation” as “the use of
all methods and procedures” necessary to recover
listed species, including habitat acquisition and
maintenance. Id. § 1532(3) (emphasis added). To
advance the Act’s species survival and recovery goals,
Congress entrusted the Secretary with broad
discretion to designate as critical habitat both
occupied and unoccupied areas that the Secretary
determines are “essential for the conservation of the
species.” Id. § 1532(5)(A)(i), (ii).
In this case, the Secretary reasonably
concluded that unoccupied habitat includes areas
where the endangered species does not currently live,
but which could be acquired or improved to provide
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for the species’ biological and physical needs. Indeed,
the Secretary’s decision was driven in large part by
the unanimous recommendation of the scientific peer
review panel that designation of critical habitat
outside Mississippi was absolutely essential to
recovery of the species. Under these circumstances,
the Secretary’s determination was eminently
reasonable and consistent with the ESA’s species
recovery goals. Cf. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 708
(explaining that judicial deference is particularly apt
where Secretary’s interpretation is supported by “the
text, structure, and legislative history of the ESA”).
As in Sweet Home, and with even stronger factual
support in this case, the text of the ESA as well as its
structure,
purpose,
and
legislative
history
demonstrate that the Secretary’s interpretation was
reasonable. Id. at 697.
A. The text of the ESA indicates that Congress
consciously chose to authorize the Secretary to
designate unoccupied habitat that is essential
to the conservation of the species even though
it may lack all of the “physical or biological
features” required for immediate occupancy.
“When Congress includes particular language
in one section of a statute but omits it in another
section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the
disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Allison Engine Co.
v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 671
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(2008) (quoting Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534
U.S. 438, 452 (2002)); see, e.g., Dep’t of Treasury, IRS
v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 494 U.S. 922, 932
(1990) (“A statute that in one section refers to ‘law,
rule or regulation,’ and in another section to only
‘laws’ cannot, unless we abandon all pretense at
precise communication, be deemed to mean the same
thing in both places.”). This is particularly true where
Congress has included limiting language in one
provision but not in another adjacent or nearby
provision in the same statutory section. See United
States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1990) (finding it
“significant” that Congress explicitly limited scope of
“any crime” to only federal crimes but placed no
similar limiting language on “any other term of
imprisonment,” which appears only two sentences
later in statute); Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean,
135 S. Ct. 913, 919 (2015) (observing that “[t]he
interpretive canon that Congress acts intentionally
when it omits language included elsewhere applies
with particular force” where relevant statutory
provisions are “in close proximity”); Jama v.
Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335,
341–42 (2005) (“We do not lightly assume that
Congress has omitted from its adopted text
requirements that it nonetheless intends to apply,
and our reluctance is even greater when Congress has
shown elsewhere in the same statute that it knows
how to make such a requirement manifest.”).
When Congress amended the ESA in 1978 to
define “critical habitat,” it included two distinct
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statutory provisions, one for occupied habitat and one
for unoccupied habitat:
(i) the specific areas within the
geographical area occupied by the species,
at the time it is listed in accordance with
the provisions of section 1533 of this title,
on which are found those physical or
biological features (I) essential to the
conservation of the species and (II) which
may
require
special
management
considerations or protection; and
(ii) specific areas outside the geographical
area occupied by the species at the time it
is listed in accordance with the provisions
of section 1533 of this title, upon a
determination by the Secretary that such
areas are essential for the conservation of
the species.
16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A). Subsection (i) authorizes the
Secretary to designate areas “within the geographical
area occupied by the species,” if those areas contain
the “physical or biological features . . . essential to the
conservation of the species.”
Id. § 1532(5)(A)(i)
(emphasis added). Subsection (ii), on the other hand,
authorizes the Secretary to designate areas “outside
the geographical area occupied by the species,” if he
determines those areas are “essential for the
conservation of the species.” Id. § 1532(5)(A)(ii).
While the designated areas for both types of critical
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habitat must be “essential for the conservation of the
species,” Congress included the limiting terms
“physical or biological features” only in subsection (i).
Congress acted “intentionally and purposely”
by including the terms “physical or biological
features” in subsection (i) and omitting them from
subsection (ii), two statutory provisions that are
closely related in subject matter and proximity.
Allison Engine Co., 553 U.S. at 671 (quoting
Barnhart, 534 U.S. at 452); MacLean, 135 S. Ct. at
919. The text, therefore, signals Congress’ intent to
limit the Secretary’s authority to designate occupied
critical habitat to areas with physical or biological
features that are “essential to the conservation of the
species,” but not the Secretary’s authority to
designate unoccupied critical habitat. In doing so,
Congress must have understood that there would be
situations where the Secretary would need to
designate unoccupied critical habitat that might not
contain all the required “physical or biological
features” at the time of designation.
Petitioner erroneously reads section 3(5)(A)(ii)
to state that Unit 1 must, at present or in the
foreseeable future, contain all the physical or
biological features necessary for occupancy by the
dusky gopher frog. See Pet. Brief at 27. This reading
would require the Court to ignore the text of the
statute and Congress’ clear intent to omit this
requirement for unoccupied critical habitat
designations. See Dean v. United States, 556 U.S.
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568, 572 (2009) (explaining that courts “ordinarily
resist reading words or elements into a statute that
do not appear on its face” (quotation omitted)).
B. The structure of the ESA shows that Congress
intended that critical habitat designations be
used to conserve areas that are currently
unoccupied but essential to achieve species
recovery.
“It is a fundamental canon of statutory
construction that the words of a statute must be read
in their context and with a view to their place in the
overall statutory scheme.” Food & Drug Admin. v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120,
133 (2000) (citation omitted); see also U. S. Ass’n of
Texas v. Timber of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S.
365, 371 (1988) (“A provision that may seem
ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the
remainder of the statutory scheme . . . because only
one of the permissible meanings produces a
substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of
the law.”). The term “essential” is part of the phrase
“essential for the conservation of the species,” as well
as the larger statutory scheme aimed at species
recovery, and the term must be read in that context.
The statute expressly defines the term
“conservation” as “the use of all methods and
procedures which are necessary to bring any
endangered species or threatened species to the point
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at which the measures provided pursuant to [the Act]
are no longer necessary.” 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3). FWS
regulations similarly define “recovery” as the
“improvement in the status of listed species to the
point at which listing is no longer appropriate
under . . . the Act.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. Thus, the
phrase “essential for the conservation of the species”
in section 3(5)(A)(ii) authorizes the Secretary to
designate as critical habitat areas that are necessary
to achieve species recovery. A reading of section
3(5)(A)(ii) requiring that unoccupied critical habitat
be presently habitable would unreasonably constrain
the Secretary’s authority to use “all methods
necessary” to achieve species recovery and frustrate
Congress’ goals in enacting the ESA.
The objectives of the ESA are two-fold: species
survival and species recovery. See Gifford Pinchot
Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d
1059, 1070 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Congress intended that
conservation and survival be two different (though
complementary) goals of the ESA.”); Sierra Club v.
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434, 438 (5th Cir.
2001) (“[T]he objective of the ESA is to enable listed
species not merely to survive, but to recover from
their endangered or threatened status.”). Listing a
species as endangered or threatened is the critical
first step in preventing the extinction of the species;
indeed, 98% of listed species survive. FWS, Defining
Success Under the Endangered Species Act,
Endangered Species Bulletin (July 12, 2013),
https://www.fws.gov/endangered/news/episodes/bu-
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04-2013/coverstory/index.html.
Critical habitat
designation, however, is the chief mechanism to
achieve recovery of imperiled species. Gifford Pinchot,
378 F.3d at 1070. Species recovery requires future
expansion into new territory to support a larger,
recovered population, thereby necessitating the
designation of geographically distant or presently
unsuitable lands as critical habitat. Michael J. Bean,
The Endangered Species Act: Science, Policy, and
Politics, 1162 Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 369, 378 (2009).
Because Congress authorized the Secretary to “use all
methods and procedures which are necessary” to
recover a species—not “merely to forestall extinction”
of the species, Gifford Pinchot, 378 F.3d at 1070—the
Secretary may designate unoccupied land as critical
habitat even if it is not, at present, actively
supporting the species.
The ESA’s recovery objective is further carried
out by the requirement that the Secretary develop
and implement recovery plans “for the conservation
and survival of endangered and threatened species.”
16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1). The Act requires that the
Secretary incorporate into each recovery plan “sitespecific management actions as may be necessary to
achieve the plan’s goal for the conservation and
survival of the species” and “objective, measureable
criteria which, when met, would result in a
determination . . . that the species be removed from
the list.”
Id. § 1533(f)(1)(B)(ii).
This section
reinforces the ultimate purpose of the statute: to
achieve species recovery through the use of
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conservation measures, including habitat restoration.
Recovery plans implemented by FWS, including the
approved recovery plan for the dusky gopher frog,
frequently include habitat restoration of unoccupied,
degraded habitat as a key component of achieving
species recovery via increasing habitat availability for
listed species. 4 Without the ability to consider
marginally suitable and currently unsuitable land
areas as needed for species recovery, recovery plans
could not achieve their purpose of species
conservation.
Similarly, the Secretary has
reasonably interpreted “essential” unoccupied critical
habitat to include potentially suitable areas to
achieve species recovery via conservation measures,
such as habitat acquisition and maintenance.
If suitable habitat conditions were available to
the dusky gopher frog, the species’ population would
not have diminished to fewer than 100 individuals.
Pet. App. 108a n.28. Where, as here, “the biggest
threat to critically endangered species is the
destruction of habitat, . . . it does not make sense to
hamstring [the Secretary’s] efforts to conserve the
See, e.g., Recovery Plan, supra; FWS, Devils River Minnow
(Dionda diaboli) Recovery Plan (Aug. 10, 2005); Kathryn
Kennedy & Jackie Poole, Chisos Mountain Hedgehog Cactus
(Echinocereus chisoensis var. chisoensis) Recovery Plan (Dec. 8,
1993); FWS, Recovery Plan for the Alabama Beach Mouse
(Peromyscus polionotus ammobates), Perido Key Beach Mouse (P.
p. trisslylepsis), and Choctawhatchee Beach Mouse (P. p.
allpphrys) (Aug. 12, 1987); FWS, Coachella Valley Fringe-Toed
Lizard (Uma inornata) Recovery Plan (Sept. 11, 1985).
4
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species by limiting the designation of habitat to only
those areas that contain optimal conditions for the
species.” Id. (quoting FWS). Unoccupied, marginally
suitable or unsuitable habitat that can be made
suitable plays a key role in recovering imperiled
species when optimal habitat areas do not exist
because in order to recover, species must be able to
expand into new habitat areas. Bean, supra, at 378.
Recognizing this, the ESA authorizes the Secretary to
consider suboptimal areas that can be restored to
provide vital additional habitat when the Secretary
determines that such habitat is essential for the
conservation of the species.5
C. The broad remedial purpose of the ESA
supports the Secretary’s interpretation of
“essential for the conservation of the species.”
Congress enacted the ESA “to provide a means
whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered
species and threatened species depend may be
conserved.” 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b). The Act further
directs agencies “to use all methods and procedures
which are necessary” to preserve endangered species.
See FWS, Final Designation of Critical Habitat for the Perdido
Key Beach Mouse, Choctawhatchee Beach Mouse, and St.
Andrew Beach Mouse, 71 Fed. Reg. 60,238, 60,253–54 (Oct. 12,
2006) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) (finding unoccupied
habitat essential to the conservation of the species even though
the habitat did not currently contain all physical or biological
features for the species’ needs and designating such restorable
unoccupied habitat as critical).
5
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Id. § 1532(3). This Court has examined the text,
structure, purpose, and history of the Act to conclude
that “[t]he plain intent of Congress in enacting this
statute was to halt and reverse the trend toward
species extinction.” Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437
U.S. 153, 184 (1978). The Court noted that “the
institutionalization of caution lies at the heart” of the
statute. Id. at 153. This goal of species recovery,
observed the Court, “is reflected not only in the stated
policies of the Act, but in literally every section of the
statute.” Id.; see also Sierra Club, 245 F.3d at 438
(“[T]he objective of the ESA is to enable listed species
not to merely survive, but to recover from their
endangered of threatened status.” (emphasis added)).
Consistent with the ESA’s recovery goals, this
Court has affirmed the Secretary’s authority to
interpret the general language of the statute to
include habitat protection. In Sweet Home, for
example, the Court upheld the Secretary’s
interpretation of “harm” in section 3 of the ESA as
including “habitat modification.” 515 U.S. at 695. In
doing so, it rejected the lower court’s conclusion that
the term harm “must refer to the direct application of
force because the words around it do.” Id. at 701. The
Court looked to the broad purposes of the Act to
uphold the Secretary’s interpretation that the word
harm should include indirect threats to species from
habitat destruction. Id. The Court noted that the
ESA is “the most comprehensive legislation for the
preservation of endangered species ever enacted by
any nation,” id. at 699 (quoting Hill, 437 U.S. at 180),

24
and that the 1973 enactment contained a “sweeping
prohibition against the taking of endangered species.”
Id. The Court concluded: “Given Congress’ clear
expression of the ESA’s broad purpose to protect
endangered and threatened wildlife, the Secretary’s
definition of ‘harm’ is reasonable.” Id. at 700.
Recognizing the “considerable breadth” with
which this Court has treated the ESA’s terms, lower
courts have declined to add words like “habitable”
that would limit the Secretary’s authority to
designate unoccupied habitat as essential to the
conservation of a species. See, e.g., Bear Valley Mut.
Water Co. v. Jewell, 790 F.3d 977, 994 (9th Cir. 2015)
(refusing to read “habitable” into provision allowing
FWS to designate unoccupied land as critical habitat
because doing so would contravene plain text of ESA,
“which requires [FWS] to show the area is ‘essential’
without defining that term as ‘habitable’”); Ariz.
Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. Salazar, 606 F.3d 1160, 116667 (9th Cir. 2010) (refusing to limit occupied habitat
to areas where species actually reside because
allowing FWS “to designate as occupied habitat where
the species is likely to be found promotes the ESA’s
conservation goals and comports with the ESA’s
policy of institutionalized caution” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Sierra Club, 245 F.3d at 438
(refusing to limit designations of unoccupied critical
habitat to only endangered species because
unoccupied critical habitat should be designated for
both threatened and endangered species where it is
necessary to achieve species recovery).
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Where, as in the case of the dusky gopher frog,
the species’ conservation depends on land that, while
not presently suitable, is the only viable option for
bringing that species back from the brink of
extinction, the Secretary must be able to designate it
as critical habitat. If the Secretary is unable to do so,
the dusky gopher frog, and other species like it, will
be limited to small patches of fragmented habitat
with little or no chance for survival and eventual
recovery.
D. The legislative history of the ESA confirms
the Secretary’s interpretation that critical
habitat includes unoccupied areas that may
require restoration.
When Congress enacted the ESA in 1973, it did
so to “widen the protection which can be provided to
endangered species.” H.R. Rep. No. 93-412 from the
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,
accompanying H.R. 37, at 1, reprinted in A Legislative
History of the ESA at 140. In 1973, and during
subsequent amendments and reauthorizations of the
ESA, a significant focus of these “widened”
protections was critical habitat. See, e.g., H.R. 37, at
5 (1973), reprinted in A Legislative History of the ESA
at 144 (“The protection of habitat of endangered
species is clearly a critical function of any legislation
in this area.”); 119 Cong. Rec. 25, 669 (1973),
reprinted in A Legislative History of the ESA at 358
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(finding land acquisition essential to success of ESA
because “most endangered species are threatened
primarily by the destruction of their natural
habitats”); H.R. Rep. No. 94-887 (1976), reprinted in
A Legislative History of the ESA at 497 (“[T]he
ultimate effectiveness of the Endangered Species Act
will depend on the designation of critical habitats.”);
House Consideration & Passage of H.R. 8092 (1976),
reprinted in A Legislative History of the ESA at 506
(“The listing process is meaningless unless the
Departments take the appropriate steps to protect
species’ habitats.”).
When Congress passed Senate Bill 2899 in
1978, it expressly rejected proposed amendments that
would have restricted the definition of unoccupied
critical habitat. Specifically, Congress considered and
rejected two requirements: (1) that an unoccupied
area be “one into which the species can be expected to
expand naturally,” Senate Consideration & Passage
of S. 2899, with amendments, Congressional Record,
July 18, 1978, reprinted in A Legislative History of the
ESA at 1065, and (2) that an unoccupied area be one
that is “periodically inhabited by the species,” House
Consideration & Passage of S. 2899, with
amendment, in lieu of H. R. 14104, Congressional
Record, Oct. 14, 1978, reprinted in A Legislative
History of the ESA at 879. In doing so, Congress
signaled its intent to give the Secretary broad
authority to designate unoccupied critical habitat
limited only by the requirement that the areas be
“essential for the conservation of the species” and not
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by any temporal or habitability requirements. 16
U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(ii); see Hill, 437 U.S. at 184
(“Agencies in particular are directed by §§ 2(c) and
3(2) of the Act to ‘use . . . all methods and procedures
which are necessary’ to preserve endangered species.”
(emphasis in original) (citations omitted)).
Petitioner’s reading of section 3(5)(A)(ii) would
prohibit the Secretary from designating habitat
deemed necessary for recovery by the best scientific
data available merely because it does not currently—
but could in the future—support a population of
dusky gopher frogs. This contradicts the Act’s
legislative history, which reveals that Congress
rejected language that would have imposed temporal
and habitability requirements restricting the
Secretary’s broad authority to designate unoccupied
critical habitat.
II.

Conservation of Unoccupied Habitat,
Even If Suboptimal, Is Essential for
Recovering Species Threatened by
Climate Change.

Scientists,
legal
professionals,
and
policymakers have recognized the world is changing
at a sufficiently rapid pace due to climate change and
that a static conservation policy cannot adequately
respond to this change. See Holly Doremus, The
Endangered Species Act: Static Law Meets Dynamic
World, 32 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 175, 176 (2011).
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Species’ range shifts and behavioral changes based on
climate change impacts are well-documented.
Camille Parmesan & Gary Yohe, A Globally Coherent
Fingerprint of Climate Change Impacts Across
Natural Systems, 421 Nature 37, 38–39 (2003).
Rising temperatures are forcing many endangered
and threatened species to migrate away from their
home ranges. See J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the
Endangered Species Act, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 22 (2008).
Critical habitat designations must be able to respond
to the increasing threats listed species face, and
future listed species will face, as a result of climate
change. See Doremus, supra, at 215 (asserting that
ESA should take into account often unstable course of
nature).
The Secretary addressed threats posed by
climate change for dusky gopher frogs by designating
sites at a sufficient distance from the frogs’ current
occupied habitat to serve as refuges, if the sites
presently occupied are “negatively affected by
environmental threats or catastrophic events.” Final
Designation, 77 Fed. Reg. at 35,124. Due to habitat
fragmentation and the frogs’ “limited natural ability
to move through the landscape,” the Secretary
identified dusky gopher frogs as particularly
“susceptible to the effects of rapid climate change”
and determined that “[t]he designation of critical
habitat, and the creation of new populations of dusky
gopher frogs through reintroductions, should give the
species better odds of survival and recovery given the
threats posed by climate change.” Id. Thus, the
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Secretary exercised his authority to designate
unoccupied critical habitat to protect and recover this
imperiled species. Without the ability to designate
unoccupied, presently unsuitable areas as critical, the
Secretary would lack the tools to protect sufficient
habitat for the recovery of dusky gopher frogs and
similarly imperiled species.
III.

The Secretary’s Decision Not to
Exclude an Area from Critical Habitat
Designation Is Judicially
Unreviewable.

Although the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) embodies a “basic presumption of judicial
review,” Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140
(1967), abrogated on other grounds by Califano v.
Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977), section 701(a)(2) of the
APA “bars judicial review of agency action when the
matter in dispute has been ‘committed to agency
discretion by law,’” Drake v. F.A.A., 291 F.3d 59, 70
(D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)). This
“very narrow exception,” Citizens to Pres. Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971),
abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders,
430 U.S. 99 (1977), applies where the statute provides
“no judicially manageable standards . . . for judging
how and when an agency should exercise its
discretion,” Heckler, 470 U.S. at 830; see also Overton
Park, 401 U.S. at 410 (holding that an action is
committed to agency discretion by law “where
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statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a
given case there is no law to apply” (citation omitted)).
A. Section 4(b)(2) establishes no “judicially
manageable standards” by which to judge the
Secretary’s discretionary decision not to
exclude an area from critical habitat
designation.
A plain reading of section 4(b)(2) shows that,
while a decision to exclude an area from designation
is reviewable, a decision not to exclude is not. See
Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 600 (1988) (looking first
to the language of the provision at issue to determine
whether a judicially manageable standard existed).
The first sentence of section 4(b)(2) provides that
“[t]he Secretary shall designate critical habitat . . . on
the basis of the best scientific data available and after
taking into consideration the economic impact, the
impact on national security, and any other relevant
impact, of specifying any particular area as critical
habitat.” 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (emphasis added).
The second sentence states that
[t]he Secretary may exclude any area from
critical habitat if he determines that the
benefits of such exclusion outweigh the
benefits of specifying such area as part of
the critical habitat, unless he determines,
based on the best scientific and
commercial data available, that the failure
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to designate such area as critical habitat
will result in the extinction of the species
concerned.
Id. (emphasis added).
Congress articulated judicially manageable
standards in the second sentence of section 4(b)(2) by
conveying that the Secretary has the discretion to
exclude areas from designation after following the
statute’s specified process. See Pet. App. 34a–35a.
The second sentence prohibits exclusion in certain
circumstances: if the Secretary determines that the
benefits of exclusion do not outweigh the benefits of
inclusion, or if extinction would result from exclusion.
See Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of the Bay Area v. U.S. Dep’t of
Commerce, 792 F.3d 1027, 1033 (9th Cir. 2015) (“The
term ‘outweigh’ in the second sentence limits the
agency’s discretion to exclude areas from
designation.”).
Because the statute bars the
Secretary from excluding areas in these defined
instances, secretarial decisions to exclude areas from
designation are reviewable.
Moreover, a decision to exclude “otherwise
essential habitat is . . . properly reviewable because it
is equivalent to a decision not to designate critical
habitat”—an action that section 4(b)(2) obligates the
Secretary to take. Bear Valley Mut. Water Co., 790
F.3d at 990.
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In contrast, section 4(b)(2) does not articulate
any judicially manageable standards “governing
when the [Secretary] must exclude an area from
designation.” Pet. App. 35a (emphasis in original).
The permissive language of the second sentence of
section 4(b)(2) gives the Secretary the discretion to
prioritize conservation when making an exclusion
decision.
Even if the Secretary determined that the
economic benefits of exclusion did outweigh the
benefits of inclusion, the statute would not obligate
the agency to exclude the area. See 16 U.S.C.
§ 1533(b)(2); cf. Amy Sinden, The Economics of
Endangered Species: Why Less Is More in the
Economic Analysis of Critical Habitat Designations,
28 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 129, 196 (2004) (“Rather than
mandating an approach that would ensure that
critical habitat was never designated when economic
costs outweighed benefits, Congress sought only to
give the Secretary the flexibility to deviate from a
purely biological approach when she deemed it
appropriate.”). Under no circumstances does the
second sentence obligate the Secretary to exclude an
area from designation. 6 See Pet. App. 34a–35a; see
Additionally, as the Ninth and Fifth Circuits have recognized,
the agency has the discretion to choose its methodology when
making decisions pursuant to section 4(b)(2). See Bldg. Indus.
Ass’n, 792 F.3d at 1032–33 (“[A]fter the agency considers
economic impact, the entire exclusionary process is discretionary
and there is no particular methodology that the agency must
follow”); Pet. App. 36a (“[Section 4(b)(2)] does not require a
6
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also Bear Valley Mut. Water Co., 790 F.3d at 990. The
ESA’s “broad purpose to protect endangered and
threatened wildlife” supports this plain reading of
section 4(b)(2). See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 700; see
also supra Sections I.B.–C. (discussing the ESA’s
objectives and broad remedial purpose).
This Court and lower courts have found that
similar provisions in other statutes fail to articulate
judicially manageable standards. See, e.g., Webster,
486 U.S. at 594, 600 (holding that section 102(c) of the
National Security Act of 1947, which provides that the
director of Central Intelligence can terminate
employees “whenever he shall deem such termination
necessary or advisable in the interests of the United
States,” “foreclose[d] the application of any
meaningful judicial standard of review”); Baltimore
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 252 F.3d
456, 461 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that section 717 of
the Natural Gas Act, providing that the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission “may in its discretion
bring an action” against a violator, provided no
particular methodology for considering economic impact.”);
Kalyani Robbins, Recovery of an Endangered Provision:
Untangling and Reviving Critical Habitat Under the
Endangered Species Act, 58 Buff. L. Rev. 1095, 1111 (2010)
(“Congress did not mandate an actual cost-benefit analysis for
designating critical habitat—rather, it allowed the agencies to
‘take into account’ economic impacts, which is quite different,
and does not lend itself to striking down designations for
inadequate consideration of economic impacts.” (footnotes
omitted)).
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judicially manageable standards to review the
agency’s decision to settle an enforcement agreement);
Sierra Club v. Larson, 882 F.2d 128, 129, 132 (4th Cir.
1989) (holding that section 131 of the Highway
Beautification Act, requiring that states exercise
“effective control” over outdoor advertising, provided
“no law to apply” to the Federal Highway
Administration’s
decision
not
to
institute
enforcement proceedings).
The only circuit courts to address this issue
have held that the decision not to exclude an area
from critical habitat designation is unreviewable. See
Pet. App. 34a–35a; Bear Valley Mut. Water Co., 790
F.3d at 990. District courts have reached the same
conclusion. See Aina Nui Corp. v. Jewell, 52 F. Supp.
3d 1110, 1132 n.4 (D. Haw. 2014) (holding the
Secretary’s “ultimate decision not to exclude [an area]
from designation” was committed to agency
discretion); Cape Hatteras Access Pres. Alliance v. U.S.
Dep’t of the Interior, 731 F. Supp. 2d 15, 29 (D.D.C.
2010) (finding the Secretary’s decision not to exclude
is unreviewable under the APA because “the plain
reading of the statute fails to provide a standard by
which to judge the . . . decision”); Home Builders Ass’n
of N. Cal. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. CIV. S-050629 WBS-GGH, 2006 WL 3190518, at *20 (E.D. Cal.
Nov. 2, 2006) (“[T]he court has no substantive
standards by which to review the [Secretary’s]
decisions not to exclude certain tracts based on
economic or other considerations, and those decisions
are therefore committed to agency discretion.”),
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opinion
modified
on
other
grounds
on
reconsideration, No. CIV. S-05-0629 WBS-GGH, 2007
WL 201248 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2007). But see Wyo.
State Snowmobile Ass’n. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.,
741 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1248 (D. Wyo. 2010).
B. Bennett v. Spear is inapposite.
In Bennett v. Spear, the question was whether
the petitioners could seek judicial review under the
ESA’s citizen-suit provision. 520 U.S. 154, 157 (1997).
The Bennett petitioners claimed that the Secretary
made an implicit critical habitat designation for an
endangered fish by issuing a Biological Opinion under
section 7(b) of the ESA without first considering the
purported designation’s economic impact under
section 4(b)(2). Id. at 160. The government contended
that the petitioners could not pursue this claim under
the citizen-suit provision, which authorizes citizen
suits when the Secretary fails to perform “any act or
duty” under the ESA “which is not discretionary.” Id.
at 171–72 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(C)). The
Supreme Court held that the petitioners could seek
judicial review under the citizen-suit provision
because section 4(b)(2) requires the Secretary to
consider the economic impacts before designating
critical habitat. Id. at 172. The Court thus allowed
the petitioners to proceed on their claim that the
Secretary failed to satisfy a procedural requirement.
Id. at 178.
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In Bennett, the Secretary did not make an
exclusion decision under section 4(b)(2), and the
parties never briefed—nor did the Court address—
whether a decision not to exclude an area from
designation is separately reviewable. Thus,
Petitioner’s reliance on the obiter dictum that the
“Secretary’s ultimate decision [to designate critical
habitat] is reviewable only for abuse of discretion,” id.
at 172, is inapposite. See Central Va. Cmty. Coll. v.
Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 363 (2006) (“[W]e are not bound to
follow our dicta in a prior case in which the point now
at issue was not fully debated.”).
Further, unlike in this case, the Bennett
petitioners alleged that the Secretary did not adhere
to section 4(b)(2)’s procedural requirements when he
failed to consider the economic impacts of a purported
implicit critical habitat designation. Bennett, 520 U.S.
at 160, 172. The Bennett Court stated that “[i]t is
rudimentary administrative law that discretion as to
the substance of the ultimate decision does not confer
discretion to ignore the required procedures of
decisionmaking.” Id. at 172. Here, there is no
question that the Secretary followed the required
procedural step of considering economic impact when
he designated critical habitat for the dusky gopher
frog under the first sentence of section 4(b)(2). Rather,
Petitioner argues that the Secretary’s failure to
exclude Unit 1 from the ultimate critical habitat
designation was incorrect. However, as set forth
above, see supra Section III.A., the Secretary’s
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decision not to exclude an area from designation is
unreviewable.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the court of appeals should be
affirmed.
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